John Delach

When the order for the second torpedo attack was received, Admiral Sprague excused the destroyer escorts since they carried only three torpedoes. Never-the-less, the Samuel B. Roberts skipper, Lieutenant Commander R.W. Copeland, decided to follow the destroyers becoming the fourth ship in the attack column.

The Japanese concentrated on the three destroyers allowing the Roberts to remain undetected until it was less than 4,000 yards from the heavy cruisers. Roberts let loose her three torpedoes that ran, “hot straight and normal,” blowing the bow off of the heavy cruiser Chokai.”

The time was 0755.

By now the destroyer Heerman was dead in the water and sinking, but the two other destroyers, Hoel and the badly damaged Johnston along with the Roberts scurried back to form a screen around the carrier, Fanshaw Bay,  to make smoke and fire their five-inch guns at will. Their target, the cruiser, Tone, answered back with its main battery of eight-inch guns and around 0850, “Roberts took her first hit below the waterline followed by additional hits in rapid succession.”

At about 0900, Skipper Copeland reported that “…a tremendous explosion took place on his ship that he believed to have been caused by two or three 14-inch shells,” that only a battleship could fire. They tore a great, jagged hole 30 to 40 feet long and 7 to 10 high on the port side. The damage was so severe that all power was lost and the ship was reduced from stack to stern to ‘an inert mass of battered metal.”

Despite the complete loss of power, the crew of No. 2 gun managed to get off six salvos by hand. Unfortunately, a seventh attempt failed, killing the three members of the gun crew. Abandon Ship was ordered at 0910 but not completed until 0935 because the skipper insisted that the wounded be given first aid and placed on rafts.

Roberts lay over about 80 degrees then gave a twist and slowly sank by the stern at 1005.  

Copeland concluded his post action report by repeating what he informed the crew what they should expect over loudspeaker system:

“This will be a fight against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected, during which time we would do what damage we could.’ In the face of this knowledge, the men zealously manned their stations wherever they might be and fought and worked with such calmness, courage and efficiency that no higher honor could be conceived than to command such a group of men.”

Of the compliment of 215 men, 90 went down with the ship or succumbed to injuries received or exposure during the 50 hours spent on rafts or in the water before they were rescued.

The American Navy lost two escort carriers, Fanshaw Bay and St. Lo, two destroyers, Hoel and Johnston, and the destroyer escort, Samuel B. Roberts.  

Admiral Kurita was never quite sure if he was fighting a lowly squadron of jeep carriers and their screening ships or Halsey’s powerful Third Fleet, but the little escorts and the flyers of Taffy 3 did enough damage to send the Japanese force back to their home port in Java. Most of these ships never went to sea again.

The little ships and their aviators saved the day, and Halsey’s legacy would always be  questioned by his decision to desert supporting these little ships in favor of chasing the former decoy Japanese carriers.

As in any battle, once the engagement began, fate became the hunter.